

Carnegie Mellon
SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

Session-Typed Concurrent Contracts

HANNAH GOMMERSTADT

LIMIN JIA & FRANK PFENNING

Sorting Process



Sorting Process



← 3



SORTING
SORTING

Sorting Process



← 3

← 5



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Sorting Process

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
← 3



← 5



← 4



Sorting Process

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
← 3



← 5




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
Session Types?!



$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$




Session Types?!




$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$



← cons




Session Types?!



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


← cons



$int \wedge list;$


Session Types?!



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
← cons




$int \wedge list;$



← 5




Session Types?!



$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$




← cons



$int \wedge list;$



← 5




$list;$

Session Types as Contracts

- Session types prescribe communication contracts between processes
- Dynamically typechecked because processes are untrusted
- Prior work (POPL 2016) on monitoring and blame assignment

Sorting Contract

Contract we have:


$$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$$

Contract we want:

All received integers are
in ascending order

Challenge

How do we dynamically monitor contracts that cannot be expressed as session type?

Contributions

- Partial-identity processes that monitor stateful contracts dynamically
- Monitor generation from type refinements
- Method for verifying that monitors are partial identities

Partial Identity Monitors!

- Processes written in the same language as all other code
- Abort if contract is violated, otherwise are transparent
- Check properties by using internal state



Sorting Monitor



Sorting Monitor



← 3



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Sorting Monitor



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
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


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Sorting Monitor



Sorting Monitor



Sorting Monitor



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assert (5 > 3)

← 3



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
Sorting Monitor

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


Sorting Monitor

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



assert (5 > 3)





Sorting Monitor

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Sorting Monitor

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List Identity Process

`list_id : list ← list`

`a ← list_id b =`

`case b of`

`| nil ⇒ a.nil; wait b; close a`

`| cons ⇒ x ← recv b;`

`a.cons(x);`


`a ← list_id b;`



`a:list`



`b:list`



$list = \oplus \{cons:int \wedge list; nil:1\}$

List Identity Process

`list_id : list ← list`

`a ← list_id b =`

`case b of`

`| nil ⇒ a.nil; wait b; close a`

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`a ← list_id b;`



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`b:list`



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List Identity Process

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
`a ← list_id b;`



`a:list`



`b:list`



$$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$$

List Identity Process

`list_id : list ← list`

`a ← list_id b =`

`case b of`

`| nil ⇒ a.nil; wait b; close a`

`| cons ⇒ x ← recv b;`

`a.cons(x);`


`a ← list_id b;`



`a:list`



`b:list`



$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list; nil: 1\}$

Sorted List

```
asc_mon: list ← int option, list ;;
```

```
a ← asc_mon bound b =
```

```
case b of
```

```
| nil ⇒ a.nil; wait b; close a
```


```
| cons ⇒ x ← recv b;
```



a:list



b:list


$$list = \oplus \{cons: int \wedge list, nil: 1\}$$

```
case bound of
```

```
| None ⇒ a.cons(x); a ← asc_mon (Some x) b
```

```
| Some y ⇒ assert (x >= y);
```

```
    a.cons(x); a ← asc_mon (Some x) b;
```

Other Exciting Contracts

Contract	Monitor State
List of parentheses is well matched	Stack – push for (, pop for)
List of integers corresponds to correctly serialized binary tree	Stack – push for node, pop for leaf
Sorting procedure permutes elements of a list	Sum of hash values of each element
Doubling process mapped over a list of integers is monotonic	Input integer
Refinements on integers	None
Factoring procedures outputs integers that multiply to input	Input integer

Checking Refinements

- Encode refinements as type casts
- Can generate a partial identity monitor to check the refinement

$$\{A\}_a \Leftarrow \{B\}_b$$

Integer Refinement Translation

$$\{n: \mathit{int} \mid n > 0 \wedge A\}_a \Leftarrow \{n: \mathit{int} \wedge B\}_b$$

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$$\{n: \mathit{int} \mid n > 0 \wedge A\}_a \Leftarrow \{n: \mathit{int} \wedge B\}_b$$

```
x ← recv b;  
send a x;
```

Integer Refinement Translation

$$\{n: \mathit{int} \mid n > 0 \wedge A\}_a \Leftarrow \{n: \mathit{int} \wedge B\}_b$$

```
x ← recv b;  
assert (x > 0)  
send a x;
```

Integer Refinement Translation

$$\{n: \mathit{int} \mid n > 0 \wedge A\}_a \Leftarrow \{n: \mathit{int} \wedge B\}_b$$

$x \leftarrow \text{recv } b;$

assert ($x > 0$)

send a $x;$

$$\{A\}_a \Leftarrow \{B\}_b$$

Label Refinement Translation

$$\oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list}; \mathit{nil}: \mathbf{1} \}_b$$

Label Refinement Translation

$$\oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list}; \mathit{nil}: \mathbf{1} \}_b$$

case b of

| $\mathit{nil} \Rightarrow$

| $\mathit{cons} \Rightarrow$

Label Refinement Translation

$$\oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list}; \mathit{nil}: 1 \}_b$$

case b of

| $\mathit{nil} \Rightarrow \mathbf{assert\ (false)}$

| $\mathit{cons} \Rightarrow \mathit{a.cons};$

Label Refinement Translation

$$\oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list}; \mathit{nil}: 1 \}_b$$

case b of

| $\mathit{nil} \Rightarrow \mathbf{assert\ (false)}$

| $\mathit{cons} \Rightarrow \mathit{a.cons};$

$$\{ \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \{ \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_b$$

Translation is Transparent

- Prove that generated monitors are partial identity processes

$$\begin{array}{c} a: A \leftarrow b: B \\ \approx \\ a \leftarrow \boxed{\{A\}_a \Leftarrow \{B\}_b} \leftarrow b \end{array}$$

Redundant Monitor

$$\oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list}; \mathit{nil}: \mathbf{1} \}_a \Leftarrow \oplus \{ \mathit{cons}: \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_b$$

case b of

| $\mathit{cons} \Rightarrow \mathit{a.cons}$;

$$\{ \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_a \Leftarrow \{ \mathit{int} \wedge \mathit{list} \}_b$$


Safety Theorem

- Prove that subtype casts do not cause assertion failures

$$\begin{array}{c} B \leq A \\ a \leftarrow \{A\}_a \Leftarrow \{B\}_b \leftarrow b \end{array}$$

Safety Theorem

- Prove that subtype casts do not cause assertion failures



Partial Identity Rules

$$a:\mathit{int} \wedge 1 \leftarrow \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \leftarrow \text{recv } b; \\ \text{send } a \ n; \\ \text{wait } b; \\ \text{close } a; \end{array}} \leftarrow b:\mathit{int} \wedge 1$$

Partial Identity Rules

$a:\mathit{int} \wedge 1 \leftarrow$ n \leftarrow recv b;
send a n;
wait b;
close a; $\leftarrow b:\mathit{int} \wedge 1$

$a:\mathit{int} \wedge 1$ [n] \leftarrow send a n;
wait b;
close a; $\leftarrow b: 1$

Partial Identity Rules

$a:\mathit{int} \wedge 1 \leftarrow$ n \leftarrow recv b;
send a n;
wait b;
close a; $\leftarrow b:\mathit{int} \wedge 1$

$a:\mathit{int} \wedge 1$ [n] \leftarrow send a n;
wait b;
close a; $\leftarrow b: 1$

$a:1$ [] \leftarrow wait b;
close a; $\leftarrow b: 1$

Partial Identity Criterion

- Complications occur when monitors spawn other monitors (higher order case)
- Construct a bisimulation between monitoring processes and identity processes showing that every observable message is the same

Future Work

- Even more exciting contracts!
 - Contracts which require distributed state (ghost messages), ie permutation checking
 - Noninterference/information flow contracts

Related Work

- Recently:
 - Melgratti & Padovani (ICFP 2017)
 - Waye et al (ICFP 2017)
- Contracts: Findler & Felleisen (2002), Dimoulas et al (2011,2012), Disney et al (2012)

Takeaway

Partial identity monitors provide a mechanism to express complex stateful contracts in the same language as the target code